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Abstract‡ 
 
We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public 
expenditure. Besides redistributing personal income by means of taxes 
and transfers, the government supplies goods and services. The 
government chooses the tax schedule that is found acceptable by the 
largest share possible of the population. We show that there is a unique 
income tax schedule that is universally acceptable. The progressivity of 
the income tax is shown to depend on the composition of the public 
expenditure and on the substitutability between the goods and services 
supplied by the government and the consumption goods privately 
obtained through the market. We test the empirical implications of the 
model. Specifically, we use OECD data to observe the relationship 
between marginal tax rates and the distribution over the taxpayers of the 
benefits produced by the specific composition of the government 
expenditure in the provision of goods and services. We confirm that for 
lower elasticities of substitution between public and private goods, there 
is a negative relationship between marginal tax rates and pro-taxpayer-
bias, and for higher elasiticities, there is a positive relationship. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the interdependence between the income redistribu-
tion policies and the composition of public expenditure. The literature on
income taxation has mostly focused on the disincentive e¤ect of taxation
on labour supply. In contrast, we emphasise that, besides redistributing in-
come, the income tax also nances the public provision of a set of goods and
services that are valued by individuals. Higher taxes reduce private con-
sumption but increase the supply of the goods furnished by the government.
Therefore, the individual valuation of alternative tax and expenditure poli-
cies depends on the balance between private consumption and public supply
of goods. We also depart from the standard literature in that, instead of
assuming that the income taxes are selected by majority voting, we focus on
the tax schedules that are found universally acceptable, i.e. nobody wants
to change their steepness. We show that there is a unique tax schedule
that satises this acceptability criterion and examine its properties. The
progressivity of the income tax turns out to depend on the composition of
the public expenditure and on the substitutability between the goods and
services supplied by the government and the consumption goods privately
obtained through the market.
We test the empirical implications of the model. Specically, we use
OECD data to observe the relationship between marginal tax rates and
the distribution over the taxpayers of the benets produced by the specic
composition of the government expenditure in the provision of goods and
services. We use threshold regressions to conrm that for lower elasticities
of substitution between public and private goods, there is a negative rela-
tionship between marginal tax rates and pro-taxpayer-bias, and for higher
elasiticities, there is a positive relationship.
We divide the commodities into two sets as to whether they are obtained
through the market or through the government. The government, besides
redistributing income through taxes and cash transfers,1 supplies goods and
services such as general administration, education, health, law-and-order,
infrastructures, culture, or defense. These expenditures are nanced with
the net revenue of the income tax (net of the social transfers). We wish
to investigate the relationship between the redistribution of money income
1The redistributive task of the government has been the object of extensive studies
by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001a), (2001b) and (2003).
Their concern is the relationship between the pre-tax income inequality, the progressivity
of the income tax and the size of the social transfers. They leave aside the public provision
of goods and services.
2
through taxes and transfers and the composition of public expenditure in
goods and services. These two aspects have mostly been studied in separate
realms of public economics, and not in conjunction.2
The supply of goods and services by the government constitutes a large
share of the public budget compared to social cash or near-cash transfers.3
Moreover, it is well-known that di¤erent types of commodities and ser-
vices have di¤erential redistributive impact along the income distribution.4
Health tends to uniformly benet the entire population and education is
strongly redistributive.5 Of course, there are other lines in the public bud-
get, such as foreign service, culture or law-and-order, that give benets
increasing with income (or income taxes).6 Di¤erent compositions of gov-
ernment spending can be interpreted as di¤erent ways of distributing its
2The incidence and e¢ ciency of income taxation has usually been analyzed in ab-
straction from from public expenditures. Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) and Cremer and
Gahvari (1997) show that welfare can be improved by some public supply of goods. Meltzer
and Richard (1985), Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), Pirttil and Tuomala (2002), and
Blomquist and Christiansen (2007) focus on the publicly supplied good being complemen-
tary to labour (e.g. day care). An increase in the supply will increase the productivity
and the tax collection. Besley and Coate (1991), Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), and
Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) study the case of publicly provided goods whose quan-
tity/quality cannot be supplemented through the private market, for example public vs
private education. Boadway and Marchand (1995) study a system that allows supplemen-
tation. Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) compare the relative merits of the two systems.
In Epple and Romano (1996) individuals vote over the level of the public provision of a
good and the budget balancing proportional income tax. Since the only redistribution pos-
sible is through the publicly supplied good this is (nearly) tantamount to choosing a budget
balanced linear income tax. The macroeconomics literature has also given some attention
to the impact of government spending on individual behaviour. The key issue here has
been whether public and private expenditures are complements or a substitutes. Barro
(1981), Aschauer (1985), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993),
Karras (1994), Ahmed and Yoo (1995), Ambler and Cardia (1997), Amano andWirjanto
(1998), and Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) all are relevant contributions.
3For the UK 2004/2005 the average yearly non-contributory social cash and near-cash
benets were 40 percent of the benets in kind received from the public provision of
education and health (Jones, 2006).
4The basic reference is Musgrave et al (1974). Hansen and Weisbrod and Pechman
developed a controversy in the period 1969-1971 at the Journal of Human Resources over
the distributional impact of higher education subsidies. More recently, Le Grand (1982)
and Evandrou et al. (1993) have also studied the distributional impact of the public
spending.
5On the distributional e¤ects of taxes and benets (education and health) in the UK,
see Jones (2006) in the annual report Economic Trends.
6 In Adam Smiths words: The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support
that order of things, which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages.
(. . . ) Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in reality,
instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or those who have some property
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benets over the income distribution. A more pro-rich expenditure policy
may have a positive e¤ect on those who bear the heavier part of the tax
burden. Rich people can see that a signicant fraction of their taxes comes
back to them in the form of the kind of goods and services they value most
and this may soften their attitude towards income taxation. In our empirical
test, we proxy the pro-taxpayer bias of public expenditure by the inverse of
the share of public primary education.
Our work contains a second major novelty. This is how taxes are chosen.
There are two major lines of research of how the current literature deals
with the choice of taxation. One is that a benevolent government chooses
that tax function that maximizes social welfare.7 This tax has nice e¢ -
ciency properties, but is not representative of the observed behaviour by
tax authorities. The second line known as positive, in contrast with the
previous normative approach  conceives taxation as chosen by majority
voting. Individuals have preferences over the available tax functions and,
under some assumptions, the tax that obtains a majoritarian support is the
one preferred by the median voter.8 This positive approach, while appeal-
ing because of its Politico-Economic avour, has no e¢ ciency properties and
yields predictions that seem refuted by facts. The median voter model ap-
pears to fail on three of its empirical implications. The rst implication is
that higher income inequality will lead to higher progressivity in taxation
because of the increased distance between mean and median income.9 The
second implication is that individuals with incomes higher than the mean
would support zero income taxation, while people below the mean would
support redistributive taxation, the more progressive the poorer they are.10
against those who have none at all.(Book V, Chap. 1, Part II)
7Modern literature on optimal, normative income taxation originates in Mirrlees(1971).
A modern rigorous account of optimal income taxation can be found in Myles (1995),
Chapter 5.
8The key references are Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981)
9Perotti (1996) nds no evidence of a signicant relationship between inequality and
redistribution in democracies. The implication that the median voter is decisive in the
choice of the degree of redistribution has recently been empirically tested by Milanovics
(2001) and Wong (2004). They nd no evidence of such a decisive role of the median
voter.
10Such tax resistancedoes not emerge from opinion polls. According to the US 1998
Gallup Poll as cited in Fong (2001) among American families with incomes of $10,000
or less, 35 percent report that the government should not redistribute wealth by heavy
taxes on the rich and 21 percent believe that the poor should help themselves rather than
this being the governments responsibility. For the entire sample these percentages are
53.9 percent and 30.2 percent, respectively. More interestingly, Fong nds that income
is a very poor predictor of redistributive attitudes. Wong (2004) also nds no evidence
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A third implication is that poor individuals refrain from voting for full ex-
propriation because they are aware that labor supply will elastically respond
to high taxation so that increases in progressiveness would reduce the tax
collection and harm the transfer-receiving poor.11
Our approach to how taxes get selected is di¤erent. We simply assume
that the government chooses the tax schedule that is considered acceptable
to the largest share of the population possible. An individual considers a tax
schedule acceptable if she does not wish to modify its steepness by means
of an a¢ ne transformation that keeps the same net tax revenue. For every
individual there is a (large) set of acceptable tax schedules. The government
then chooses the tax schedule that is most widely accepted. As we shall see,
there is a unique tax schedule that is unanimously acceptable. Furthermore,
this tax schedule has the standard e¢ ciency properties: the unanimously
acceptable tax maximizes social welfare among the tax functions yielding
the same net tax revenue. We thus provide a positive basis for a normative
tax.12
In contrast with the existing literature, our model implies that the main
determinants of redistribution are: (i) the composition of the public spend-
ing in the di¤erent commodities and services supplied by the government,
and (ii) the substitutability between the commodities privately obtained
through the market and the commodities publicly furnished. Indeed, at the
individual level income taxation is also seen as a mechanism by which dispos-
able income is turned into publicly supplied goods.13 Therefore, the degree
of substitutability between the two types of commodities plays a crucial in
of pocketbook voting in income redistribution. In contrast, Corneo and Gruner (2002)
obtain a strong and signicant relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and
expected benet from more progressive income taxation. The reason for this divergent
result might be the specicities of the set of countries they work with: six former socialist
countries, four Anglo-Saxon countries, Norway and West Germany.
11There is no evidence of an elasticity of labor supply signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Blundell and MacCurdy (1999) summarize the di¤erent existing estimates of the uncom-
pensated wage elasticity (all using di¤erent approaches and estimation techniques). The
estimates reported there give nearly rigid labor supply functions: (i) US, zero (MaCurdy
et al.,1990) and 0.05 (Triest,1990); (ii) UK, 0.09 (Blundell et al,1988), (iii) France, 0.1
(Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990); (iv) Germany -0.004 (Kaiser et al,1992); and similar
values for Sweden, Netherlands and Findland.
12While the voting models restrict to linear tax functions, in our case we place no
restriction on neither the functional form of the tax schedules nor the net tax revenue.
13Note the similarity with the case of the voluntary provision of public goods. In that
case too individuals see the tax paid as the cost necessary to obtain a useful commodity
provided by the state. On this see Warr (1983), Bernheim (1986) and Bergstrom et al
(1986).
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determining the attitudes towards taxation. We examine how the changes
in substitutability translate into the progressiveness of income taxation.
For the case of constant-elasticity preferences we can obtain explicit,
testable results. Specically we focus on two implications: (i) the (con-
stant) marginal redistributive factor (which we call marginal tax rate for
simplicity) is negatively related to the degree of substitutability and (ii) we
should observe a negative relationship between the marginal tax rate and the
pro-taxpayer bias among countries with low substitutability and a positive
relationship among countries with high substitutability. Both implications
are empirically validated by our results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we develop the
model. Section 3 denes the notion of acceptable taxation, proves the exis-
tence and uniqueness of an acceptable income tax and shows that this tax
is welfare e¢ cient. Section 4 is devoted to the relation between income tax
progressiveness, the pro tax-payer bias of public spending, and the degree
of substitutability between the private and public bundles of commodities.
Section 5 is devoted to the empirical test of the predictions of the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Individuals
We assume that there is a continuum of individuals. Individual income
is denoted by y, it is assumed to be exogenous, and distributed over the
population accordingly with the cdf F with support [a;1).
We shall denote by  the average per capita income.
The set of commodities is divided into two bundles, private (denoted
x) and public (denoted g), accordingly with the mechanism by which they
are allocated. Individual demand for the private commodities is satised
through the markets: in view of market prices individuals choose how best to
allocate their disposable income. The individual consumption of the publicly
supplied commodities is xed by the government through its expenditure
policy.
We assume that all commodity prices are constant. This allows us to
just focus on the aggregate expenditure on the two bundles of commodities
On individual preferences we make the following standard assumptions:
Assumption 1 : ux > 0; ug > 0; uxx < 0; ugg < 0 and uxg > 0: Further,
we assume that for g > 0; lim
x!0
ux = 1 and lim
x!1ux = 0; and for x > 0;
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lim
g!0
ug =1 and lim
g!1ug = 0:
The elasticity of substitution between the two commodity bundles will
play a key role in our analysis. A higher consumption of the commodi-
ties supplied by the government can be achieved only by accepting higher
taxation. This is nothing but substituting private for publicly provided
consumption goods. How much individuals will be willing to give up on
private consumption to increase the level of the public bundle depends on
their substitutability. Therefore, the individual attitudes towards taxation
will be critically inuenced by the elasticity of substitution between the two
bundles of commodities.
2.2 Income Taxation
The government raises taxes/transfers in order to redistribute income across
individuals. The net public revenue left after performing the redistribution
of incomes is spent in the provision of the public commodity bundle (for
instance, education, justice or defence). Individuals expend their disposable
income in the purchase of the private commodities. To save on notation we
denote the disposable income by x.
We denote by t(y) the tax (if positive) or the subsidy (if negative) allo-
cated to each individual with income y. Hence,
x(y) = y   t(y): (1)
Note that disposable income will exceed the pre-tax factor income when
t(y) < 0.
We denote by t the per capita aggregate net surplus/decit left after
income redistribution, i.e.
t =
Z
t(y)dF (y): (2)
2.3 Public Expenditure
The role of taxing income is not only to achieve a given degree of income
redistribution, but also to raise a net revenue to nance the provision of the
publicly supplied commodities. This net revenue will be endogenously deter-
mined together with the income tax schedule. Therefore, besides analyzing
how income redistribution depends on the key factors, we shall also have
something to say about their e¤ect on the size of government : the share of
the public supply of commodities over aggregate factor income.
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Concerning the structure of public spending, we assume that the gov-
ernment can choose the composition of the bundle in order to benet dif-
ferently the individuals on the basis of their tax payments. Hence, the
benet from public spending obtained by an individual with income y; g(y)
is g(y) = (t(y); g); where g is the per capita public expenditure. This de-
scription of public spending is aimed at capturing the preferences for the
di¤erent commodities of this bundle at di¤erent income levels. Transferring
resources from primary education to the support of opera or economic ac-
tivities is a way of compensating the rich for the burden of the taxes paid,
as these commodities are more appreciated the higher is the income (and
the tax) of the individual. The geographical location of the public resources
may also introduce a bias in favor or di¤erent income groups. Think, for
instance, on the allocation of the police force by neighborhoods. It may be
allocated uniformly or making its numbers be larger the richer the area. All
these are instances of how di¤erent compositions of public spending produce
a bias in the distribution of the benets favoring the rich taxpayers.
There are di¤erent arguments made in support of such policies. All basi-
cally boil down to a sort of pro-incentives idea: to give to the tax-payer goods
and services that at least partially respond to the size of their contribution.
This may be intentional or the outcome of a more intensive or e¤ective
lobbying by the rich before the government in favor of the publicly provided
goods they like best.14 The bottom line is that the tax-payers perceive that
the benets will be proportionate to the tax contributed. Incentive argu-
ments may be used to advocate in favor of such expenditure policies. We
would expect tax-payers to look more favorably upon progressiveness in in-
come taxation if they know that they can ripe part of the benets deriving
from their contributions.
The governments budget is balanced and hence
g 
Z
g(y)dF (y) = t: (3)
In order to make the problem more operational, we shall specialize to
the case in which
(t(y); g) = t(y) + (1  )g = t(y) + (1  )t: (4)
When  = 1 individuals obtain publicly supplied goods by the same
amount they have paid for in taxes. At the other extreme, when  = 0
14See Esteban and Ray (2006) for a model of lobbying with imperfect capital markets.
The government may be confounded by signals that respond to the size of the benets as
well as to the wealth of the lobbying groups.
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public spending will be fully egalitarian. Throughout the analysis we shall
assume that there are rigidities in the expenditure policy so that  cannot
be modied by the government in the short run.
A budget balanced scal policy is fully characterized by  and the tax
function t(:).
One of the main points of this paper is that individual attitudes with
respect to taxation and redistribution critically depend on the expenditure
policy followed by the government. In the next section we shall study how
the tax policies chosen by society depend on the given redistributive bias of
the public expenditure as captured by .
We have already mentioned that the substitutability between the private
and the public bundles of commodities will play a key role in determining the
individual attitudes with respect to taxation. This substitutability obviously
depends on the nature of the commodities included in each bundle, bit it
can also be inuenced by government policy decisions. Allowing for private
security instead of keeping it as a monopoly of the governmentincreases
the substitutability between the two bundles. The same can be said of
health, education, or even defense or prisons, for instance.
For reasons of tractability we shall not address the issue of the choice of
substitutability and will consider the elasticity of substitution as an exoge-
nous parameter.
3 Acceptable Income Taxation
3.1 Denition
Let us start by putting the concept of acceptable taxation in perspective.
In the politico-economic literature on income taxation individuals observe
the existing distribution of income and consider a¢ ne transformations of
this distribution yielding the same (nil) net tax revenue. Individuals estab-
lish a preference orderings over the set of feasible a¢ ne transformations.
The socially chosen linear income tax is the one corresponding to the a¢ ne
transformation earning a majoritarian support.
In this paper, for each tax function individuals consider the di¤erent
feasible a¢ ne transformations yielding the same net tax revenue (not neces-
sarily nil). In other words, they consider all possible variations in steepness.
For each t(:) every individual associates the a¢ ne transformation she prefers
the most. A tax function t(:) will be acceptable to an individual with in-
come y if the most preferred a¢ ne transformation consists of leaving the
steepness unchanged. The social support for a given tax function is given
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by the share of the population that nds it acceptable. A tax function will
be collectively acceptable if it earns unanimous support.
Let us now be more precise. Consider a particular t(:) with net tax rev-
enue t, as dened in (2). An individual with income y considers alternative
a¢ ne transformations ~t such that
~t(y) = + t(y): (5)
with Z
~t(y)dF (y) =
Z
[+ t(y)]dF (y) =
Z
t(y)dFy): (6)
Because of (6) we obtain that
~t(y) = t+ [t(y)  t]: (7)
The parameter  denes the degree of progressiveness of ~t(y) relative to
t(y). Choosing  > 1 implies that all the individuals contributing below
average will see their contribution diminished while the ones with incomes
above will contribute more. The opposite will happen when  < 1. There-
fore,  > 1 increases [and  < 1 decreases] the progressiveness of ~t(y) relative
to t(y).
We shall place very weak restrictions on the tax functions. We shall work
with the set  of all functions from < to < that are strictly increasing.
Consider any arbitrary t(:) 2  and any given . The valuation of a
change in progressiveness by  will be
u(y   [t+ (t(y)  t)]; [t+ (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t): (8)
Given a tax function t(:) we denote by (t; y) the progressiveness change
preferred by an individual with income y.
Denition 1 A tax function t(:) is individually acceptable to a person with
income y if (t; y) = 1.
A tax function t(:) will be individually acceptable to y if that individual
would not benet from changing its progressiveness [by means of a constant
net tax collection a¢ ne transformation]. We denote by =(y) the set of all
tax functions t(:) 2  that are individually acceptable to earners of income
y.
We assume that the government seeks to maximize support. To this
e¤ect, the government chooses the tax function that is acceptable to the
largest share possible of the population. We explore here the most demand-
ing acceptability requirement: unanimity.
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Denition 2 A tax function t(:) is collectively acceptable, t(:) 2 =, if it is
unanimously accepted; that is, if t(:) 2 T
y
=(y).
A tax function will be acceptable if every individual agrees not to vary
its progressiveness. As we shall now see such a stringent requirement does
not yield an empty set.
3.2 Existence of Acceptable Income Taxation
We start by noting that the notion of "acceptable taxation" is not meant
to describe any explicit institutional process. Rather, we wish to capture
the idea that the income tax schedule has been chosen so as to avoid any
signicant rejection on either side of the income ladder. A substantial change
in the progressiveness of the income tax does not appear to rank high atop
in the agenda of political parties in OECD countries. Accordingly, we view
the existing tax as the result of an informal evolution aiming at gaining the
most widespread support over the population.
In short, we simply pose the following question: is there a tax sched-
ule such that a vast majority of the population would not feel compelled
to change its steepness? If the answer were in the a¢ rmative one would
expect to observe tax schedules close to the one attracting such widespread
acceptance.
Surprisingly, the requirement of unanimous acceptance is neither too
stringent nor too loose. For any given distribution of income there is always
one and only one tax function in the set  that satises this property.
Theorem 1 The set = is non-empty and contains one single element only.
Proof Consider any arbitrary t(y), t and : The valuation of a  a¢ ne
transformation, as in (8), will be
u (y   [t+  (t(y)  t)] ;  [t+  (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t) : (9)
It can be readily veried that the utility valuation is concave in : Hence,
the rst order condition fully characterizes the preferred :
Di¤erentiating with respect to  we obtain
@u
@
= (t(y)  t)  ux  y   ~t(y); (y; ~g)+ ug  y   ~t(y); (y; ~g) :
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Note that for all t(:) 2 , (t(y)   t) 6= 0 except for at most one value of y.
Hence, (y; t(y)) is implicitly characterized by the condition
ux (y   [t+  (t(y)  t)] ;  [t+  (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t)
ug (y   [t+  (t(y)  t)] ;  [t+  (t(y)  t)] + (1  )t) = : (10)
If t(y) is universally acceptable it has to be that (y; t(y)) = 1 for all y:
We start with an arbitrary parameter t and with the implicit denition
of t(y) by
ux (y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)
ug (y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t) = : (11)
Because of Assumption 1, the left-hand-side of (11) is strictly increasing
in t(y); it goes to innity as t(y)! y and to zero as t(y)!  1  t: Hence,
for each t and y there exists a unique t(y) satisfying (11). We can thus write
t(y) =  (y; t; ): (12)
It can be readily veried that  is continuous and strictly increasing in
y and continuous and strictly decreasing in t.
For an arbitrary t, the average tax collection t is
t =
Z
 (y; t; )dF (y) = (t; ):
The socially acceptable tax-transfer policy t(:) is given by (12) evaluated
at t; where t satises t = (t; ):
We need now to show that  has a x point. That is, we need to show
that  intersects the 45o line. Since  is continuous and strictly decreasing
in t, so is . From (10) we can easily obtain that for t = 0,  (y; 0; ) > 0 for
all y. Therefore, we have that for t = 0, (0; ) > 0. Since  is continuous
and strictly decreasing in t, there exists a unique t such that t = (t; ).
This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 has the remarkable implication that there is a unique tax
schedule that satises the requirement that all the individuals agree on not
changing its progressiveness.
A clarifying remark is now in order. When we dened individual ac-
ceptability we only considered changes in the steepness of the tax function
that did not modify the aggregate tax revenue. This restriction may make
the reader wonder whether we have introduced a hidden restriction on the
tax functions truly under consideration. The answer is in the a¢ rmative for
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what concerns the particular tax function t(:) being evaluated. However,
the set =(y) is obtained after having tested the acceptability of all possi-
ble strictly increasing functions with any arbitrary aggregate tax revenue.
Therefore, the set =(y) contains tax functions yielding very di¤erent aggre-
gate tax revenues. When we check whether there is a function belonging to
all the individually acceptable sets we nd one particular function produc-
ing its own aggregate tax revenue. The aggregate tax revenue is determined
together with the shape of the tax function.
3.3 Properties of Acceptable Income Taxes
We have uniquely characterized an income tax function based on the notion
of individual acceptability, combined with a government seeking maximum
(unanimous) support. This places our approach within the positive, politico-
economic approach to taxation. Yet, in contrast with this literature, the
acceptable income tax we have characterized has interesting e¢ ciency prop-
erties: the acceptable income tax maximizes Social Welfare among all the
tax functions in  that yield the same net tax revenue. Hence, our notion
of acceptability and unanimous support establishes a bridge between two
quite independent branches of the literature on income taxation: positive
and normative.
Before examining the e¢ ciency properties of the acceptable income tax
let us rst show that the marginal tax rate is positive and does not exceed
unity.
Proposition 1 The marginal tax rate satises 0  t0(:)  1.
Proof Totally di¤erentiating (10) with respect to t(:) and y and rear-
ranging we obtain
dt(:)
dy
=
uxgux   uxxug
(uxgux   uxxug) + (uxgug   uggux) :
Observe now that the numerator and the rst term in the denominator are
the same and that they are positive because of Assumption 1. Because of
the same Assumption 1 the second term in de denominator is positive as
well. Therefore, the marginal tax rate is positive and below unity.
We dene the (Utilitarian) Social Welfare as the sum of the individual
utilities, that is,
W (t(:)) =
Z
u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)dF (y): (13)
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We shall now show that W (t(:)) W (t(:)) for all t(:) 2  with net tax
revenue t.
Proposition 2 Let t(:) be an acceptable income tax function with net tax
revenue t. Then, t(:) maximizes the Utilitarian Social Welfare over all tax
functions t(:) 2  with net tax revenue t.
Proof We can write
W (t(:)) W (t(:)) =
=
Z
[u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)  u(y   t(y); t(y) + (1  )t)]dF (y):
Since u(:; :) is concave in the tax function, and using (10), we can write
W (t(:)) W (t(:)) 

Z
[t(y) t(y)][ ux(y t(y); t(y)+(1 )t)+ug(y t(y); t(y)+(1 )t)]dF (y) = 0:
We have already mentioned that an acceptable income tax maximizes
welfare subject to a net revenue constraint. Note that the revenue is xed
together with the tax function. The implication is that had we xed an
arbitrary exogenous net tax revenue (di¤erent from t) we would have found
no collectively acceptable tax function yielding this arbitrary revenue.
3.4 Discussion
In this paper we have assumed that individual incomes are exogenous. The
literature on income taxation, both normative and positive, assumes instead
that individual incomes depend on the labor time/e¤ort supplied. This
assumption is essential because it is the awareness of the negative e¤ects of
taxation on labor supply what prevents the support of the full redistribution
of incomes even by the poor. Yet, as already mentioned, there is no solid
evidence of an elasticity of labor supply signicantly di¤erent from zero.
If one assumes that income is exogenous, what prevents poor individuals
from accepting full income equalization only? In our case, besides modifying
the disposable income, income taxation also has an e¤ect on the amount of
the commodities supplied by the government. Therefore, di¤erent tax func-
tions imply a di¤erent mix of the private and publicly supplied consumption
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goods. Changing the progressiveness of an income tax may reduce individ-
ual well-being because of an ine¢ cient mix of private/public consumption
goods.
The government policy allocates the publicly supplied commodity as an
increasing function of ones contribution in taxes. If a low-income earner
demands more progressiveness  and hence a larger transfer she will be
trading-o¤more private consumption for less public consumption. Likewise,
high-income earners might be willing to give up on private consumption in
order to obtain higher levels of public consumption. At the equilibrium tax
schedule, the marginal rate of substitution between the private and publicly
supplied commodities will be equal across the population.
Note that it is precisely this property that makes acceptable tax functions
welfare e¢ cient.
Finally, let us informally discuss [a formal analysis in the next section]
the degree of progressiveness in an acceptable income tax. Let us start with
a linear income tax as the benchmark. Let us consider the e¤ect of an
increase by  of an income y. Because of the biassed expenditure policy,
with a linear income tax private and public consumption will increase at
the same rate. Suppose now that preferences have a falling elasticity of
substitution of private for public consumption. Individuals with an income
increased by  would have preferred a more than proportional increase
in the supply of the public good and hence would rather have favored an
increasing marginal tax rate. If the elasticity of substitution moves in the
opposite way we would have had a preference for declining marginal tax
rates. Clearly, whether individuals will unanimously support a tax function
with increasing or decreasing marginal tax rates critically depends on the
change in the elasticity of substitution as the consumption levels move up.
In the next section we shall examine in detail the case of preferences with a
constant marginal rate of substitution.
Note that the previous argument is also critical for the e¤ects of in-
creased inequality on the progressiveness of taxation. Consider a discrete
distribution and a transfer of income to a richer individual. The donor will
decrease the consumption of both types of commodities and the beneciary
will increase both. However the proportional decrease of one and increase
of the other will increase depend on the magnitude of the change in the
elasticity of substitution. If the proportion is the same for the two, the ef-
fects will cancel out and the same (proportional) tax will still be acceptable.
However, if this is not the case, the tax will need to be readjusted. The
direction of the change obviously depends on whether the beneciary of the
transfer "demands" a more or less than proportional increase in the supply
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of the public consumption good [and similarly for the donor].
In the next section we shall examine this issue for the class of CES
preferences.
4 Income Tax Progressiveness and Public Expen-
diture
We shall restrict individual preferences to be of the CES type. This will
permit us to examine the e¤ects of income inequality, expenditure bias and
elasticity of substitution on the tax schedule and on the size of government.
4.1 CES Preferences
The family of CES utility functions is given by:
u(x; g) =
h
x
 1
 + (1  )g  1
i 
 1
; (14)
with the elasticity of substitution  > 0:
The marginal utilities to the two types of consumption are
ux = x
  1

h
x
 1
 + (1  )g  1
i 1
 1
; and
ug = (1  )g  1
h
x
 1
 + (1  )g  1
i 1
 1
:
Therefore,
ux (x; g)
ug (x; g)
=

1  

y   t(y)
t(y) + (1  )t
  1

= : (15)
We can thus easily obtain that
t(y) =
y   (1  )t
1 + 
; (16)
where
 =


(1  )

: (17)
Integrating over the incomes y we can obtain
t =
  (1  )t
1 + 
:
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Hence,
t =

1 + 
= g: (18)
Therefore, we obtain that the acceptable income tax schedule is linear
t(y) = y   T; (19)
where
  1
1 + 
and T  1  
1 + 

1 + 
: (20)
From (18) we immediately obtain the size of the public sector to be
g

=
1
1 + 
: (21)
For all OECD countries g <
1
2 . Therefore, in view of (21) and of (17)
we can deduce that the empirically relevant parameter values satisfy:
 > 1; and

(1  ) > 1: (22)
4.2 Income Taxation and Public Spending
We can now state our results on income taxation and the size of government.
We start with the e¤ect of  and  on the marginal tax rate t0(:).
Proposition 3 Let preferences be CES. Then: (i) the unique acceptable
income tax is linear; (ii) it is independent of the distribution of income;
(iii) the (constant) marginal tax rate, t0(:)   , increases (decreases) with
the bias parameter  if the elasticity of substitution is high (low),  > 1
( < 1); and (iv) when g <
1
2 (and hence (22) is satised) an increase in
the elasticity of substitution reduces the marginal tax rate.
Proof Statements (i) and (ii) follow immediately from (19).
Di¤erentiating the marginal tax rate in (19) with respect to  and using
(17) we obtain
d
d
=   1
(1 + )2
d
d
= (   1) 
(1 + )2
:
This proves statement (iii). As for statement (iv) we similarly di¤erentiate
with respect to  and obtain
d
d
=   
(1 + )2
d
d
=   
(1 + )2
ln

(1  ) :
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Noting that because of (22) ln (1 ) > 0, statement (iv) obtains.
Without having made any assumption on the tax-transfer function, we
obtain that for CES preferences, the unique t(:) that would be universally
accepted would be a linear tax function. Therefore, any departure from
linearity in taxes requires signicant variations in the substitutability of the
two bundles of commodities as income varies.
By the same argument, the inequality in the distribution of pre-tax in-
come will not play a major role in determining the degree of income redis-
tribution,  , unless individual preferences display a signicant variation in
the degree of substitution as real income changes.
The marginal tax rate depends upon the bias of government spending.
The e¤ect of a more egalitarian expenditure policy,  ! 0 on the marginal
tax rate  critically depends upon the degree of substitutability between the
two bundles of goods. For low substitutability,  < 1, the marginal tax rate
tends to unity and for high substitutability,  > 1, it tends to zero.
Finally, in economies with a moderate share of government an increase
in the substitutability between the two bundles of goods will decrease the
marginal tax rate,  .
Let us now turn to the e¤ects of  and  on the size of government g .
From (21) we can easily obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Let preferences be CES. Then, the size of government g :
(i) increases with the bias parameter ; and (ii) decreases with the elasticity
of substitution .
The results in Proposition 4 are not surprising. Yet, they are worth
recording. The rst result says that the higher the pro-taxpayer bias in the
public spending the larger will be the size of the government that the pop-
ulation will consider acceptable. The second result tells us that increasing
the substitutability between the market and the publicly supplied goods will
induce a demand for a smaller size of the government.15
15This result seem in contradiction with Karrass (1994) argument that the larger is the
public sector the more the goods and services supplied will be substitutes for the goods
provided through the market. Two points are in order. First, Karras does not take into
account that the substitutability between public and private goods critically depends on
the political decision of allowing or not the private supply of substitutes (e.g. security, mail
service, prisons,...). Second, Karrass argument does consider whether such an increase in
the size of government would be considered acceptable. This precisely is our point: if the
government allows for higher substitutability the policy that will be found acceptable will
consist of a smaller size of the government sector.
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4.3 Discussion
At the end of the previous section, we have already discussed the role of
the elasticity of substitution in the determination of the chosen income tax
schedule. Let us now focus on the e¤ect of the bias in public spending, ,
and of the elasticity of substitution, , on the marginal tax rate.
In order to develop an intuition, imagine that the publicly supplied good
is security. The bias in public spending will the be the allocation of the
number of policemen depending on the tax e¤ort by each neighborhood.
An egalitarian policy,  = 0, consists of assigning the same number of po-
licemen per person irrespective of the taxes paid. A pro-incentive,  = 1,
makes the number of policemen proportional to the taxes paid. Accordingly
with our assumptions, security is not an inferior good so that high income
individuals would like to have more policemen than poor individuals. Since
the government has the monopoly of the supply of police force, the rich will
be willing to accept to pay more taxes than the poor. If the two goods are
complements, the rich will have to nance the increase of police force in all
neighborhoods.
Suppose now that the government increases , thus increasing the bias
of its expenditure policy (and hence the incentives for the taxpayer). The
number of policemen is higher in the rich areas than in poor neighborhoods.
The e¤ect of this change will be that the rich paying less than under the
egalitarian policy can obtain the desired supply of security. Hence they will
accept less taxation than before. As for the poor, they are now receiving
less security and because of the bias in spending a demand of more progres-
siveness will reduce the police force even further (while increasing private
consumption). Hence the poor will be willing to accept a less progressive
taxation. On the other hand, consider the case in which both commodities
are high substitutes. This may correspond to a case in which the govern-
ment has partially given up the monopoly of the supply of police and allows
for a private market of security. The taxation that the rich will be willing
to accept will be less because they can satisfy their demand for security
through the market. In the limit, when both are perfect substitutes, there is
no reason why the rich should accept any e¤ective taxation unless all their
money comes back as the supply of security that maximizes their utility.
In our model, the supply of a subset of commodities is the monopoly of
the government. This monopoly provides the government with the coercive
power to make individuals to accept taxation on incomes. How e¤ective
this power is critically depends on the substitutability between this bundle
of commodities and the commodities individuals can purchase in the mar-
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ket. Hence, our approach suggests that the rich will lobby more strongly
for increasing the substitutability between public and private goods by pri-
vatizing as many as possible rather than about the shape of the income tax
schedule.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Testable Implications
For the case of constant-elasticity preferences, our model has well-dened,
testable implications. Specically, we shall focus on two implications:
1. the (constant) marginal redistributive factor (which we call marginal
tax rate for simplicity)  is negatively related to the degree of substi-
tutability and
2. we should observe a negative relationship between the marginal tax
rate and the pro tax-payer bias among countries with low substitutabil-
ity and a positive relationship among countries with high substitutabil-
ity.
Both implications are empirically validated by our results.
5.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
We shall now test the empirical validity of the relationship between  , 
and  implied by our results. We do not have direct data on any of the
three variables and hence we have to work with reasonable proxies. Fur-
thermore, our choice of proxies has been severely conditioned by the need of
a consistent set of basic information available for a su¢ ciently large number
of countries. We have therefore tested our empirical implications using the
OECD database16 that includes fteen countries, listed in the Appendix.
We start with our proxy for  . This is the slope of the a¢ ne tax function
that turns out to be acceptable with CES preferences. In our paper the tax
function merges together the income tax schedule and the di¤erent money
transfers. In other words, t(:) is the di¤erence between factor income (plus
retirement payments and minus retirement contributions) and disposable
income.
In purity, we would have had to test whether the di¤erence between the
two individual incomes can be represented by an a¢ ne function. The only
16We use the OECD Statistical database obtainable at www.oecd.org/statistics.
20
data base available with individual information of this kind is the Luxem-
bourg Income Study database. We performed this exercise but discarded
this option for two reasons. First, the estimated parameters were unreason-
ably unstable from year to year, hinting towards some possible deciencies
in the raw data. Secondly,  and  would have to be estimated from a
completely di¤erent source.
We have opted instead to use the maximum marginal tax rate in each
country reported in the OECD database as a proxy for  . Hence, we have
implicitly assumed that there is a stable relationship between the maximum
marginal tax rate and the slope of the a¢ ne function that would approximate
the di¤erence between factor and disposable individual incomes.
Let us now turn to our estimates for . As dened in Section 2,  captures
the pro-taxpayer bias in the public provision of goods and services, which
we denote by G. This bias depends on the share in the government budget
of the expenditures that mostly benet the low incomes versus those that
mostly benet the rich taxpayers. For some countries, discussed earlier,
there are estimates of the distribution of the benets of specic lines in
the government expenditure (essentially, education and health).17 We are
however interested in the distribution of the benets of the entire government
supply of goods and services (including general administration and law-and-
order, among others). Therefore, we have had to estimate our own proxies
for .
We rst estimate G, the total government expenditure in the provision of
goods and services, from OECD data sources. G is estimated by subtracting
the amounts that are spent on money transfers from the total amount of
government expenditure, detailed in the Appendix. All estimates are done at
constant 1995 US dollars. Of the total amount of government expenditure,
G; we focus on two redistributive, pro-poor public expenditures - health
and education. For education, we focus on all three types of expenditures -
primary, secondary and tertiary.
We estimate  with the following expression:
17There is a large literature which discusses and identies the redistributiveness of pub-
lic expenditures.(See Le Grand, 1982 for the redistributive e¤ects of health and education
in the UK - he concludes that of the two education is more redistributive). A large debate
in the 1980s (Hansen and Weisman 1969, Pechman 1970) contest the redistributive e¤ects
of higher education in particular, concluding that the redistributive e¤ects of higher edu-
cation were debatable, and that existing measurement methodologies were not successful
in e¤ectively measuring their e¤ects. We do not perform any statistical analysis to test for
the relative redistributiveness of the di¤erent types of public expenditures in the OECD
countries studied; this would entail a separate econometric exercise beyond the purview
of this paper.
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 = 1  government expenditure on redistributive goods
G
(23)
Finally, we need an estimate for the elasticity of substitution between the
two bundles of commodities, private and publicly provided, . The substi-
tutability between public and private expenditure has been a recurrent topic
in Macroeconomics. Since the work of Barro (1981) there have been numer-
ous attempts at estimating the elasticity of substitution. Aschauer (1985)
nds a signicant degree of substitutability between the two variables for
the United States. Karras (1994) nds that they are complementary or
unrelated, using data for 30 countries. Evans and Karras (1996) provide
additional evidence supporting the complementarity using data for 54 coun-
tries. More recently, Amano and Wirjanto (1998) for the US show that the
two variables are unrelated or have very weak complementarity. For Japan,
Hamori and Asako (1999) nd a signicant degree of substitutability, while
for Okubo (2003) the two bundles are complementary or unrelated. Finally,
Bouakez and Rebei (2006) with the same specication of preferences as ours
- but with habit formation - estimate  = 0:332.
Unfortunately, we will not be able to make use of these [quite contradic-
tory] estimates for the following reasons. First, most of the Macro literature
has dened substitutability by the sign of the cross derivative and not by
the value of the elasticity, . Second, the models are all inter-temporal and
this aspect proves to be critical for the estimates. Ni (1995) empirically
nds that when the two expenditures add linearly in the preferences, the
estimates indicate substitutability, while if the two expenditures enter the
utility function non-separably one obtains complementarity. Third, the esti-
mates are perplexingly contradictory. Finally, most of the literature tries to
estimate a world elasticity using panel data, but we are interested in coun-
try estimates which can be used to make a ranking across countries. Kwan
(2006), for example, using co-integration methods, has found that for nine
East Asia countries while the two bundles are substitutes on the average, in
some countries they are complements. In sum, we cannot base our empirical
work on these estimates.
Our approach to the estimation of  is therefore as follows. The substi-
tutability between the two bundles of commodities depends on the nature
of individual preferences and on the degree of monopoly that the govern-
ment keeps for itself for some subset of commodities, as discussed earlier.
For many OECD countries the postal system or security has been a public
monopoly until fairly recently. Today, however, rich people can supplement
the public supply of police force, for instance, by purchasing additional pri-
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vate security. Similarly, in many countries education and health have high
degrees of publicness while in others, a good share of the demand is satised
through the private market. The larger the share of the expenditure chan-
nelled through the market, the higher is the substitutability between the
public and the private provision of these goods. For our purposes, therefore,
we estimate a proxy of the elasticity of substitution using a metric , which
equals the ratio of private over the total of public and private expenditures.
Using this ratio, we estimate a proxy of the elasticity of substitution,  =
=(1   ): If all is private, and  = 1; then elasticity is innity. Compara-
tive data of public and private expenses have been used for both health and
education for the OECD countries in this study18. We estimate  for all
three types of education - primary, secondary and tertiary - and for health,
obtained from OECD sources. Estimates of all four types of  s is available
at the location http://darp.lse.ac.uk/expenditures.
Indeed, these estimates are very rough proxies for the "true" elasticities
of substitution. However, our empirical exercise essentially rests on the
"ranking" of the countries by their degree of substitutability more than on
its absolute value.
5.3 Relationship between  and 
In section 4.2. theory predicts that the relationship between  and  should
be negative. Here, we investigate this relationship using the data and es-
timates that have been discussed in the previous section, for all four types
of elasticities - primary, secondary and tertiary education, and health. We
estimate OLS regressions and also estimate kernel regressions to ascertain
the nature of the relationship between the two variables. The latter method
is used to allow the data to determine the true nature of the relationship,
rather than imposing a known structure.
The model we estimate is given as
 it = f(it) + "it (24)
where  it is the marginal tax rate for country i in time t , it is the
elasticity of substitution between the publicly and privately provided good
for country i in time t ; f(:) is a generic function and "it is an error term. We
do not impose any structure on f(:), except for the case when we estimate
the above relationship using OLS.
18The data source for these estimates is the OECD Social Expenditure database. Data
has been available only for specic years - 1995, 2000 and 2004.
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primary secondary tertiary health
co-e¢ cient -0.28965 -0.3013 -0.01585 -0.11361
N 374 374 374 374
Table 1: OLS Regressions for Relationship between estimates of Marginal
Tax Rate, tau and Elasticity of Substitutions, sigma
The kernel regressions support a negative relationship. This is also sup-
ported by OLS regressions as well, except for that of tertiary, given in 1.
All other three s are signicant at 1% level of signicance.
In the gures below, we present the kernel regressions for each of the four
relationships. The Epanechnikov estimator is used for the kernel regression
estimates. We present results with a smaller bandwidth (rather than a large
one) to reveal the true relationship as closely as possible. For each of the four
s it is clear that the dominant relationship between  and  is a negative
one.
tau
sigma_primary
Kernel regression, bw = .15, k = 3
Grid points
0 .418327
.451722
.600004
Figure 1: Kernel Regression of  on primary
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tau
sigma_secondary
Kernel regression, bw = .1, k = 3
Grid points
.000929 .224512
.471727
.553295
Figure 2: Kernel Regression of  on sec ondary
tau
sigma_tertiary
Kernel regression, bw = .5, k = 3
Grid points
.021579 1.21849
.505379
.544297
Figure 3: Kernel Regression of  on tertiary
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tau
Sigma_health
Kernel regression, bw = .6, k = 3
Grid points
.090909 1.51784
.336813
.556006
Figure 4: Kernel Regression of  on health
5.4 Relationship between  and 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between  and : Theory in
Section 4.2 predicts that for low values of ; there exists a negative relation-
ship between the marginal tax rate and the pro-tax bias; for higher values of
, there exists a positive relationship. We use threshold regressions to deter-
mine the value(s) of  which splits the sample into two (or more) parts, ,
such that for values of  less than the estimated threshold value, , there
is a negative relationship between  and ; and for values of  above the
estimated threshold value , there is a positive relationship between  and
: Threshold regressions thus determine the di¤erent "regimes" of the rela-
tionship between  and : Alongside the threshold regressions we estimate
kernel regressions, to ascertain the exact nature of the relationship between
 and . Figures 5 to 8 present the kernel regressions between the marginal
tax rate for each observation,  ; and the pro-tax bias, ; where the data is
sorted for increasing values of :We will rst determine the threshold values
of .
To estimate the threshold values and the regimes, we estimate the fol-
lowing model:
 it = 1i1(it  ) + 2it1(it > ) + uit (25)
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Regimes  
Regime 1 primary  0.21304 -1.12829
Regime 2 primary > 0.21304 1.448073
Table 2: Regimes obtained by Threshold Regression Estimations for Elas-
ticity of Substitution for Primary Education
where for each i,  it is the dependent variable (the marginal tax rate
corresponding to a country-year), it is the explanatory variable (the pro-
tax bias corresponding to the country-year), it is the threshold variable
(corresponding to the country-year), assumed to be strictly exogenous, 
is the threshold parameter, 1 and 2 are the slope parameters that will
di¤er according to the value of it, and uit is a random disturbance term.
1(it  ) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if it  and
0 otherwise. The threshold value of  is the estimate at which likelihood
function acheives a local minimum.19
Table 2 presents the regimes that we obtain, using primary, with the
estimates of the slope parameters. For primary; we observe that for values
of primary  0:21304, there is a negative relationship and for values greater,
there is a positive relationship between  and :20
We have also estimated the threshold values for health, and unlike the
case for primary we obtain more than two clear regimes. One interpreta-
tion of there being several threshold values is that the  and  relationship
corresponding to hea;th is a weak one. We however, present the kernel re-
gressions corresponding to health for the highest and lowest threshold values
obtained, presented below.
Kernel regressions are estimated to observe the nature of the relationship
between  ; the actual marginal tax rate, and ; the pro-tax bias. The model
estimated is given by
19There is no asymptotic theory to obtain p-values corresponding to the
the threshold value obtained, thus our reported threshold values of  de-
pends on the value obtained by minimising the likelihood function. Estima-
tions were performed using Bruce Hansens Gauss programmes obtained from
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/progs_threshold.html
20We are less interested in the redistributive e¤ects of secondary and tertiary educa-
tion, as they are least likely of all to be redistributive. For the interested reader, the
kernel regressions of the relationship between  and  for these both are presented in the
Appendix. The relationship is decidedly weaker for tertiary education.
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 it = k(it) + it (26)
where  it is the marginal tax rate for country i in time t , it is the
elasticity of substitution between publicly and privately provided good for
country i in time t ; f(:) is a generic function and it is an error term. We
do not impose any structure on k(:); we allow the data itself to determine
the functional relationship. We again use the Epanechnikov kernel estima-
tor (Silverman 1986). We also provide further kernel estimates using the
Nadaraya-Watson estimator, which are available for the interested reader at
the extended Appendix at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/expenditures/. The results
suggest similar, if not identical, results to those obtained with the Epanech-
nikov estimator.
The gures suggest that for the values of   ; the relationship be-
tween  and  is negative, while for values of it > ; the relationship is
positive. The sample size for the full data set is 375 - the data set consists
of observations from 15 OECD countries (listed in the Appendix), over the
years 1975 to 1999.
The sample is split into two sets on the basis of the threshold value
of  (corresponding to each redistributive expenditure). The relationship
between  and  is then observed for the two samples, one corresponding
to values of    and another corresponding to values of it > . The
threshold values of  that has been used to split the samples are given below,
and the nature of the relationship between  and  as observed in the kernel
regressions are presented in the gures. We have two sets of results - one
set estimating the relationship between  and primary (  corresponding to
expenditures on primary education) and another estimating the relationship
between  and total ( corresponding to expenditures on education and
health) The results for secondary and tertiary education are presented in
the Appendix.
 For  corresponding to that of primary and pre-primary education
expenditures, the threshold values are primary < 0:21 and primary >
0:21
 For  corresponding to that of health expenditures, the threshold val-
ues are health < 0:33 and health > 0:59:
Figures 5 to 8 present the kernel regressions for the relationship between
 and primary. It is clear that for values of  below the threshold value, we
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have a negative relationship between  and primary, and for values higher,
there is a positive relationship.
Kernel regression, bw = 6, k = 3
Grid points
44.5359 100
.465
.715457
gamma
tau
Figure 5: Kernel Regression of  on , for primary < 0:21
We now repeat kernel regression estimates of the relationship between
 ; and total -  estimated for total expenditures on education and health.
A cursory glance at the graphs reveals an identical relationship as before -
for lower values of ; we have a negative relationship between  and total
and for higher values of ; a positive one. The threshold values for primary
and health obtained are the same as before, as follows:
 For  corresponding to that of primary and pre-primary education
expenditures, the threshold values are primary < 0:21 and primary >
0:21
 For  corresponding to that of health expenditures, the threshold val-
ues are health < 0:33 and health > 0:59
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Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
54.8205 80.5128
.390061
.620973
gamma
tau
Figure 6: Kernel Regression of  on , for primary > 0:21
Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
44.5359 72.7368
.492827
.749072
tau
gamma
Figure 7: Kernel Regression of  on , for health < 0:33
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Kernel regression, bw = 2.2, k = 3
Grid points
61.2234 75.4867
.130935
.513965
tau
gamma
Figure 8: Kernel Regression of  on , for health > 0:59
Kernel regression, bw = 4, k = 3
Grid points
37.2515 93.1
.457609
.727172
tau
gamma
Figure 9: Kernel Regression of  on total, for primary < 0:21
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Kernel regression, bw = 4, k = 3
Grid points
48.5542 73.3213
.431283
.641999
gamma
tau
Figure 10: Kernel Regression of  on total, for primary > 0:21
Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
44.5359 72.7368
.492827
.749072
tau
gamma
Figure 11: Kernel Regression of  on total, for health < 0:33
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Kernel regression, bw = 2.2, k = 3
Grid points
61.2234 75.4867
.130935
.513965
tau
gamma
Figure 12: Kernel Regression of  on total, for health > 0:59
The relationships observed support a negative relationship between the
marginal tax rate  and the pro-taxpayer bias (for both s dened for pri-
mary education and that for total expenditure on education and health), for
lower values of the expenditureselasticities between private and public pro-
visions, and a positive relationship for higher values of the elasticities. The
relationship is less clear for the case of expenditure of tertiary education,
particularly for lower values of tertiary: as is revealed in Figures 15 and 19.
But, this is not surprising since the benets of tertiary education may befall
on mid- and high incomes and hence might not be an appropriate measure of
the bias in public spending as it has been dened here. These results are fur-
ther conrmed by kernel regressions that are estimated using the Nadaraya-
Watson estimator, a local polynomial averaging estimator, which are avail-
able in the extended Appendix at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/expenditures/ for
the interested reader.
6 Conclusion
Let us sum up. In this paper we have jointly treated public taxation and
spending. We have proposed a new notion of taxation selection, which is
more in line with available evidence of attitudes towards redistribution. This
model allows us to address novel issues such as the interdependence between
income taxation, the composition of public spending and the substitutability
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between public and private goods. The main results are that higher sub-
stitutability produces a lower progressivity of the income tax and a smaller
size of the public spending over the GDP and that stronger pro-taxpayer
bias in public spending goes with a lower/higher progressivity in the tax
function as the substitutability is low or high. Both implications turn out
to be validated by empirical evidence.
The paper has substantial room for improvement on both counts: theo-
retical and empirical. While the redistributive activity by the government
through taxes and transfers has attracted the interest of researchers, the
public spending has been comparatively neglected.
We know too little about the redistributional impact of the di¤erent lines
of the government budget G.21 Even for the countries where this information
is regularly computed such as the UK, the estimates focus on ve budget
lines only: education, health, housing subsidies, travel subsidies, and school
meals. For most countries these estimates simply do not exist. This lack of
information is paralleled by a similar lack of modelling on how the change
in the structure of government spending a¤ects the consumer behavior and
well-being.
The analysis of the substitutability between the private and publicly
provided goods and services is in still a much weaker position. We are
aware of no empirical work estimating this degree of substitutability nor of
any formal modeling of the e¤ect of the regulation of the private substitutive
supply of goods and services that are being furnished by the state.
Generally speaking, there is much to be gained by the joint analysis
of public taxation and expenditure. Our work is but a rst step in this
direction.
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A Countries used in the study - OECD database
The countries which are used for our analysis are as follows. Data has been
obtained from the OECD database, at www.oecd.org/statistics
Australia
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
The data is available from 1975 to 1999, with no missing years.
A.1 Denition of social transfers, OECD
The social transfers data, and expenditures on education and health, which
have been used to estimate G; have been obtained from the OECD Social
Expenditures database. The variables which are used to estimate the social
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transfers, obtained from the OECD data base, are the following. These so-
cial transfers are subtracted from total government expenditures to obtain
the total amount of government expenditures on public services. This will
constitute our estimate of G.
GD1P: Compensation of employees; payable
GD3P: Subsidies; payable
GD62_631XXP: Social benets and Social transfers in kind (via market
producers); payable
GD7P : Other current transfers; payable
GD9P : Capital transfers; payable.
All estimates are converted to constant 1995 US dollars.
B Further kernel regression estimates of  and 
relationship
In this section we present the set of estimates of the relationship between 
and ; for increasing values of ;the elasticity of substitution between private
and public provision, for secondary and tertiary education. As in the earlier
analysis, we split the sample of the basis of threshold values of s that have
been obtained - here as well we obtain a number of threshold values at
which the relationship switches (postive and negative) - we use the lowest
and highest values of the threshold values obtained. It is di¢ cult to make
an economic interpretation of the di¤erent threshold values obtained (over
which the relationship switches in sign), and deduce that it is indicative
of a weak/unstable relationship between  and  for these sec ondary and
tertiary. We present kernel regressions, using the Epanechnikov estimator.
The main observation is that for lower values of ; the relationship between
 and  is a positive one; and that for higher values of ; the relationship of 
and  is a negative one. The rst set of results correspond to  corresponding
to that for primary education.
 For  corresponding to that of primary and secondary education ex-
penditures, the two sets of values are for prim&sec < 0:11 and prim&sec >
0:16
 For  corresponding to that of tertiary education expenditures, the
two sets of values are for tertiary < 0:2 and tertiary > 0:29
Here we present the results that are obtained using the primary
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Kernel regression, bw = 6, k = 3
Grid points
44.5359 100
.452622
.728884
tau
gamma
Figure 13: Kernel Regression of  on  for sec ondary < 0:11
Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
66.1684 80.2213
.516455
.65
tau
gamma
Figure 14: Kernel Regression of  on  for sec ondary > 0:16
41
Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
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Figure 15: Kernel Regression of  on  for tertiary < 0:2
Kernel regression, bw = 2, k = 3
Grid points
54.8205 80.5128
.4
.6
tau
gamma
Figure 16: Kernel Regression of  on  for tertiary > 0:2
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We now estimate kernel regressions for the relationship between  and
health; corresponding to  s for secondary and tertiary education.
 For  corresponding to that of primary and secondary education ex-
penditures, the two sets of values are for prim&sec < 0:11 and prim&sec >
0:16:
 For  corresponding to that of tertiary education expenditures, the
two sets of values are for tertiary < 0:2 and tertiary > 0:29
Kernel regression, bw = 4, k = 3
Grid points
37.4359 93.1
.441423
.740851
gamma
tau
Figure 17: Kernel Regression of  on total for sec ondary > 0:11
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Kernel regression, bw = 4, k = 3
Grid points
55.7684 73.3213
.517491
.598858
tau
gamma
Figure 18: Kernel Regression of  on total for sec ondary > 0:16
Kernel regression, bw = 2.2, k = 3
Grid points
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.144121
.748285
tau
gamma
Figure 19: Kernel Regression of  on total for tertiary < 0:2
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Kernel regression, bw = 2.2, k = 3
Grid points
50.0949 73.3213
.345254
.668244
tau
gamma
Figure 20: Kernel Regression of  on total for tertiary > 0:29
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